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The "New Federalism" Approach to
Medicaid: Empirical Evidence that Ceding
Inherently Federal Authority to the
States Harms Public Health
BY DAYNA BOWEN MATrHEW*
I. INTRODUCTION
S ince its inception in 1965, the Medicaid program has been at the
center of a pendulous dance between the federal and states'
governments that jointly control its funding and administration. Strong
federal oversight and policy control marked the Medicaid program initially.
However, from its inception the Medicaid program allowed states
considerable flexibility through various waiver programs.' From 1981 to
roughly 1990, the states increasingly gained the power to exercise
discretion in administering Medicaid to their neediest citizens.2 In 1990, the
"Gallion and Baker Professor of Law and Medicine, University of Kentucky
College of Law. J.D. 1987, University of Virginia; B.A. 1981, Harvard-Radcliffe
College. This Article was presented at the University of Kentucky's conference,
"An Interdisciplinary Conference on State Law and Public Health" in October
2001, sponsored by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the Center for Disease
Control and the Gallion and Baker Professorship in Law and Medicine. Thanks to
Professors Scott Bums, Christopher Frost, and Sidney Watson, for their thoughtful
comments and insightful conversations on earlier drafts. Thanks also to my
colleague Julia Costich for fomenting scholarly exchanges as I began my
exploration of Public Health law. Any errors that remain are my own.
'Most importantly, even before its enactmentin 1965, "Section 1115 Waivers"
were available to states wishing to experiment with demonstration or pilot projects
that would further the goals of the Social Security Act. See Public Welfare
Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-43 tit. I, Sec. 122, tit. XI, § 1115, 76 Stat.
173, 192 (1962) (amended in 1965 to apply specifically to Medicaid. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1315.). For full discussion of§ 1115 waivers, see Judith M. Rosenberg & David
T. Zaring, Managing Medicaid Waivers: Section 1115 and State Health Care
Reform, 32 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 545 (Summer 1995).
2Originally enacted in 1980, the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-499, § 962(a), 94 Stat. 2650 [hereinafter ORA 1980], set the standard for
reimbursement ofnursing and intermediate care facilities and then in 1981 the
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federal judiciary stepped in to quell excesses and abusive administrative
practices by the states.3 In 1993, President Clinton began responding to
states' call for independence and relief from Federal Medicaid oversight,
urging the Department of Health and Human Services to streamline the
process for states to obtain § 1115 waivers. By 1995 the process for
relaxing federal restrictions had so developed that states met few barriers
as they began contracting with managed care providers to reduce the cost
of their Medicaid Programs.4 The result was an unprecedented and rapid
transition from traditional to managed care based delivery systems serving
the Medicaid populations. By 1998, more that fifty-three percent of all
Medicaid beneficiaries nation-wide were enrolled in managed care health
plans.5 In 1997, Congress enacted the Balanced Budget Act of 1997
("BBA") which returned considerable power to states to manage their
respective health care "safety nets" using federal Medicaid dollars. The
BBA allowed states wishing to institute mandatory managed care
enrollment for Medicaid beneficiaries to do so automatically without
seeking Federal waivers. Also, the BBA gave states increased latitude in
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2173, 95 Stat.
808 [hereinafter OBRA 1981], extended the reimbursementto hospitals. The Boren
Amendment requires reimbursement according to rates that a "State finds, and
makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and adequate to meet
the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities
in order to provide care and services in conformity with applicable State and
Federal laws, regulations, and quality and safety standards and to assure that
individuals eligible for medical assistance have reasonable access... to...
services of adequate quality." 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1994). Later, the
Boren Amendment's reimbursement standard was applied to payments made to
intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded. Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4211(h)(2)(A), 101 Stat
1330-205 [hereinafter OBRA 1987].
3 See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990) (The Court recognized
health providers had a privately enforceable right to enforce the Boren Amendment
in an action against state governments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by holding that
"lt]here can be little doubt that health care providers are the intended beneficiaries
of the Boren Amendment."). Id. at 510.
4 Two types of Medicaid waivers allowed states to bypass the federal Medicaid
restrictions during the early 1990s in order to enroll their citizens in managed care
programs. By 1998, thirty-five states operated mandatory managed care enrollment
using section 1915(b) "FreedomofChoice"waivers while another seventeen states
operated Section 1115 Research and Demonstration projects.
5 See HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A
PROFILE OF MEDICAID: CHARTBOOK 2000, 53 (2000) [hereinafter MEDICAID
CHARTBOOK 2000].
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establishing most providers' reimbursement rates.6 The pace of the
federalism dance music continues to quicken.
On January 19,2001, the eve of its departure from Washington, D.C.,
the Clinton Administration promulgated a series of Medicaid regulations
that ostensibly granted states greater flexibility in managing their Medicaid
programs, but also significantly strengthened federal requirements for states
enrolling Medicaid beneficiaries in managed care and prepaid health plans.7
One month later, the new Bush Administration froze the stronger federal
regulations enacted by its predecessors and in another six months once
again returned increased authority and discretion in the administration of
the Medicaid program to the states.
In August 2001, the Bush Administration announced it would amend
the Medicaid Managed Care and State Children's Health Insurance
Program ("SCHIP") regulations promulgated in January 2001. The Clinton-
era Medicaid regulations, now repealed, had as their stated objective "to
allow for greater flexibility for State agencies to participate in Medicaid
managed care programs and provide greater beneficiary protections and
quality assurance standards."' At the same time, the Clinton rule
6 Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4712, 111 Stat. 509
(1997). (The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 ("BBA") repealed the Boren
Amendment, and thus the statutory language that entitled providers to a legally
enforceable interest in reasonable reimbursement rates. In its place, the BBA
enacted a provision controlling only the rate setting process used by the states, not
the reimbursement rates themselves. The BBA does, however, require states to
ensure medical care accessibility and it excepts disproportionate share hospitals
("DSH") those that serve a disproportionate share of Medicaid beneficiaries-from
the more relaxed BBA rate regulations. The BBA also provided that "a state may
require an individual who is eligible for medical assistance.., to enroll with a
managed care entity as a condition of receiving such assistance." See 42 U.S.C. §
1396u-z (1998); see also Managed Care Provisions, 63 Fed. Reg. 52,022 (1998).)
7 See Final Rule (with Comment Period), 66 Fed. Reg. 6228 (Jan. 19,2001), 42
CFR Part 400, 430, 431,434, 435, 438, 440 and 447, for regulations promulgated
on the eve of the Clinton Administration's departure from the White House.
8 Id. at 6397 ("Summary of the Final Rule"); see also Joel M. Hamme, The
Second Clinton Administration: The Future of Long-Term Care Reimbursement
Under the Medicaid Program, 3 HEALTHL. PRAC. GUIDE § 33:8 (2001) (observing
that the BBA Medicaid reform "halts and reverses the trend toward federalization
of the Medicaid program."). Passed in 1997 under the Clinton Administration, the
Medicaid reforms contained in the BBA were projected to save the program $14.6
billion over the five years following the changes. These reforms included repeal of
the Boren Amendment, thus allowing states increased flexibility in setting rates for
certain institutional providers, and the relaxation of the waiver process for states
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proclaimed it "was developed with a clear emphasis on consumer
protections."9 The Clinton regulations included implementing a grievance
and appeal procedure for Medicaid managed care and prepaid health plan
enrollees; setting disclosure requirements to inform enrollees of their
choices in their own language; requiring ongoing quality assessment by
state agencies of their Medicaid managed care programs to ensure they met
access of care standards, continuity of care and grievance procedure
standards; and expanding guaranteed eligibility standards.1
Tommy G. Thompson, Department of Health and Human Services
("DHHS") Secretary, announced a new interim rule on August 17, 2001."
Explaining that the Clinton Administration rules "went far beyond what
Congress intended ... and its excessive mandates actually threatened
beneficiaries' access to care under Medicaid,' 12 Thompson said the Bush
proposal revises the grievance and appeals process, information disclosure
requirements and screening and assessment deadlines set by the Clinton
regulations. 3
According to consumer advocates, the new Bush Administration rules
will weaken patient protections and favor state governments and managed
care organizations. 4 The Administration, on the other hand, describes these
changes as measures that afford states more "flexibility" in managing their
wishing to implement managed care systems for Medicaid recipients. At the same
time, the BBA implemented the State Children's Health Insurance Plan ("SCHIP")
to provide health insurance to poor and nearly poor children at an estimated cost
of $24 million between 1998-2002. Id.
9 See Final Rule (with Comment Period), supra note 7, at 6229.
'Old. at 6397-6402.
11 See Jennifer Combs, Medicaid: HHS Issues State-Friendly Proposal
Amending Clinton-Era Managed Care Rule, Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA) (Aug.
17, 2001). See also 42 C.F.R. pts. 400,430,431, 434,435,440 and 447 (2001).
12 Combs, supra note 11.
'3 See id. The Bush Administration's "new" proposed rule, with the exception
of sections described in the text, largely re-issues the Clinton final rule, but allows
time for comment:
Alternatives Considered
We considered allowing the January 19, 2001 final rule with comment
to become effective as published, after the two 60-day delays in effective
date for Department review. However, the serious concerns raised by some
key stakeholders, especially regarding changes made to the final rule that
had not been included in the proposed rule, led us to decide to develop a
new proposed rule.
66 Fed. Reg. 43656 (Aug. 20, 2001).4 See Combs, supra note 11.
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Medicaid programs and expanding Medicaid coverage. 5 The revised rules
were announced soon after Thompson attended a February 2001 meeting
of the National Governors Association ("NGA") 6 at which the Governors
proposed "radical" changes in Medicaid. At that same NGA meeting,
Thompson pledged to "completely refocus the relationship between the
states and the federal government." 7 Thus, the new Medicaid rules
implement changes that are intended to shift the balance of power away
from the federal government, towards state government and individuals.
This article examines the likely public health impact that increased state
control over Medicaid administration will have on poor, elderly and
disabled Americans covered by the Medicaid program.
Part II begins with a brief historical summary of Medicaid's swings
between federal and state control. Part ME places Medicaid cases and
regulation within the larger context of the new federalism, focusing first on
the judicial strand of the doctrine as it applies to Medicaid administration
and performance, and then on the legislative strand. Part IV examines what
we already know about Medicaid enrollment trends and accessibility
disparities among the states. This section develops the first thesis of this
Article: The empiricallypredictable effect of increasing states' control over
Medicaid will be decreased access to healthcare for the poor, young and
disabled, in some states, and thus inevitably disproportionate harm to the
5 See, e.g., American Political Network, 6 AM. HEALTH LINE No. 9 (Aug. 6,
2001) ("The Bush administration this weekend announced a 'fundamental change'
in Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program that would give
states more flexibility in 'ensuring that their programs broaden coverage for low-
income Americans."). See also Joanne Silbemer, Analysis: White House Plan to
Expand Health-Care Coverage to the Poor Without Spending More Money, NPR:
MORNING EDION, Aug. 29,2001,2001 WL 9328664 ("The administration's new
policy, announced earlier this month, will allow states more flexibility in how they
spend Medicaid funds.").
16 Tommy G. Thompson, Federal State Relations Remarks at the National
Governors Association Meeting (Feb. 25, 2001), at http://www.hhs.gov/news/
speech/2001/010225.html.
1 Id. Thompson further added:
First of all, many of you have some concerns about a number of regulations
that were issued in the final days of the previous administration, most
notably those on Medicaid Managed Care and the State Children's Health
Insurance Program. We have heard your concerns, and today I am
announcing that we are delaying the effective dates for both regulations for
60 days. During that time, we will consult with you, advocacy groups and
health plans, and if changes need to be made, we will make them.
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public health of those states' Medicaid populations. Part V reviews the
Constitutional and historical definitions of federal and state public health
powers and concludes with the Article's second thesis: Where the access
to publically financed healthcare for America's poor, disabled, elderly and
minority citizens is at issue, the federal government's Constitutional
obligation may be to limit rather than to facilitate flexibility and autonomy
of state governments administering the Medicaid program. A brief
conclusion follows in Part VI.
II. MEDICAID AND THE "NEW" LEGISLATIVE 8 FEDERALISM
The Medicaid program provides the nation's "safety-net" for poor and
medically vulnerable individuals by forging a partnership between the
federal and state governments to administer a means-tested, health
insurance entitlement program to the needy. Begun in 1965 as a virtual
afterthought 9 to the Social Security Act's Medicare program," Medicaid2 1
was enacted as a part of President Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society"
legislation? to provide access to healthcare for America's poor, disabled
and elderly.23 It was envisioned that by providing public health insurance,
this law would remove financial barries to mainstream healthcare and thus
" The legislative strand of the new federalism refers to "a congressional about-
face in rethinking the presumption that national problems require a solution
initiated or controlled by the federal government." Jeffrey A. Modisett, Discover-
ing the Impact ofthe "New Federalism " on State Policy Makers: A State Attorney
General's Perspective, 32 IND. L. REV. 141 (1998). A most recent and poignant
example is, of course, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("PRWORA"), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105,
which replaced the national welfare system with state block grant programs. Other
examples, of course, are the legislative and regulatory Medicaid reforms
summarized herein.
'9 See Sara Rosenbaum & David Rousseau, Medicaid at Thirty-Five, 45 ST.
LouIs U. L.J. 7, 8 (2001).
20 Subehapter XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ggg
(2000).
21 Subchapter XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a-1396v
(2000).
2 See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 562 (4th ed. 2001).
23 President Johnson stated in his first speech to Congress, "We are going to
fight for medical care for the aged as long as we have breath in our bodies." Damon
Henderson Taylor, Note, ERISA Preemption: Will the Elimination of the ERISA
Preemption Clause Help or Harm America's Ability to Deal with its Pending
Health Care Crisis?, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 133, 144 (1999-2000).
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ensure access to better quality healthcare for the targeted groups.24 Initially,
although Medicaid services were reimbursedjointly by the state and federal
governments, the federal government exercised substantial control over
states' administration of the program. In order to qualify to receive federal
matching funds, states had to submit a "plan[ ] for medical assistance" '25
which the DHIHS Secretary had to approve. Each state's plan had to outline
the proposal for providing medical care to its needy residents.26 The plan
had to satisfy all the federal requirements and rules promulgated by DIHS
in the process. Because of the size of its financial investment in state
Medicaid programs, the federal government still oversees implementation
and the overarching federal controls are still in place though the rigor with
which many are enforced is greatly relaxed, especially in light of the
federal waiver initiatives aggressively employed by the states.27
Each plan must still satisfy federal criteria. Moreover, the federal
government's general revenue finances the states' administration of the
program, currently at over $100 billion annually, providing between fifty
percent and nearly eightypercent of states' Medicaid budgets.28 The federal
government, therefore, controls the program's purse-strings and states
remain dependent upon this partnership with the national government to
avoid astronomical increases in the numbers of uninsureds among their
citizenry.29 However, over the past twenty years, states have gradually been
given increasing flexibility to design and manage their own Medicaid
programs." The federal government sets the mandatory and optional
24 Jon RL Gabel & Thomas H. Rice, Reducing Public Expenditures for Physi-
cian Services: The Price of Paying Less, 9 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 595, 597
(1985). But see John V. Jacobi, Missions and Markets in Health Care: Protecting
Essential CommunityProvides Forthe Poor, 75 WASH.U.L.Q. 1431, 1437 (1997)
(arguing that both the mainstreaming and egalitarian goals of the original framers
of Medicaid program have been compromised by subsequent amendments to the
statute Jacobi concludes the original vision was vague).
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (2001).
2 id.
27 See infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of these waiver
initiatives. See also 103d Cong., 1st Sess.,MedicaidSourceBookat371 "Alternate
Delivery Option and Waiver Programs" (1993).
28 MEDICAID CHARTBOOK 2000, supra note 5, at 31. In 1998, the last year for
which reliable figures have been complied, federal Medicaid outlays totaled $101.2
billion. Combined federal and state Medicaid spending equaled $175.1 billion. Id.
See also Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 19, at 16.
29 See Rosenbaum & Rosseau, supra note 19, at 14 (without Medicaid, the
number of uninsured persons would likely rise to near seventy million).
30 Under the Medicaid program, there has always been some degree of state
flexibility- "Each state establishes its own eligibility standards, benefits package,
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eligibility criteria for program participants by establishing the eligibility
categories." However, the states set the income thresholds for these
categories, and the resource requirements for their eligible populations.
Under federal law, a rigidly defined mandatory benefits package must be
available to Medicaid enrollees. States, however, may choose to offer
coverage for a long list of optional additional benefits and services.32
Federal standards test whether the services offered in a state's benefit
package are reasonable. On the other hand, states have the freedom to set
standards to qualify participating health care providers and to set providers'
reimbursement levels though federal law controls reimbursements to some
institutional providers such as disproportionate share hospitals ("DSIT').33
Federal law also controls the distribution of Medicaid providers to ensure
access to targeted geographical areas. 4 In short, because federal Medicaid
reimbursements were (and still are) a significant 5 portion of state budgets,
payment rates and program administration under broad federal guidelines. As a
result, there are essentially 56 different Medicaid programs--one for each state,
territory and the District of Columbia." MEDICAID CHARTBOOK 2000, supra note
5, at 6.
31 The Medicaid Source Book requires all states to cover pregnant women,
children under age nineteen, those who meet the welfare program Aid to Families
with Dependent Children ("AFDC") criteria and certain disabled Supplemental
Security Insurance ("SSF) recipients. Beyond these categories, the federal
government defines several optional groups states may chose to cover such as
elderly and "medically needy" families who meet all but the income criteria for
SSI. See Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 19, at 18-19; see also FURROW ET
AL., supra note 22, at 606; 42 C.F.R. § 435.4 (2001).
32 See MEDICAID CHARTBOOK 2000, supra note 5, at 9.33 Initially, federal regulations controlled Medicaid rate-setting retrospectively,
requiring states to reimburse hospitals at the same rate as Medicare program, and
physicians at their "usual and customary" rates. Inflationary pressure and the
introduction in 1983 of the Prospective Payment System changed these expensive
reimbursement policies, but the federal government retained control overMedicaid
rate setting, as well as the authority to set broad eligibility requirements and to
define the basket of health care goods and services covered by the states. See
generally CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 228-34
(2d ed. 1998).
34 See Social Security Act § 1902(a)(30)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A)
(2000).
3' Typically, federal reimbursements range between fifty percent and eighty-
three percent of a given state's Medicaid expenditures. See Erin Lynn Connolly,
Note, Constitutional Issues Raised by States' Exclusion of Fertility Drugs from
Medicaid Coverage in Light ofMandated Coverage of Viagra, 54 VAND. L. REV.
451,456 (2001).
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the federal government has been the "more equal" member of the
federal/state partnership that administers Medicaid to the nation's needy.36
Yet, over the past twenty years, legislative reforms and case law have
gradually shifted the balance of control towards the states. In 1967, the
Medicaid Act was amended to require all states to provide early and
periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment for Medicaid beneficiaries
under age twenty-one. This represented expanded federal influence over the
program. However, in 1972 states gained increased authority to link
Medicaid eligibility to the federal Supplemental Security Income ("SSr')
program. Again, however, federal standards controlled the reform.37
The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980 ("ORA 1980") marked the
first significant relaxation in federal control over states' administration of
the Medicaid program. In ORA 1980, Congress enacted the "Boren
Amendment" which gave states the flexibility to set the rates at which
hospitals, nursing and intermediate care facilities were-reimbursed for
medical services. The Boren Amendment required that the rates be
"reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by
efficiently and economically operated facilities in order to provide care and
services in conformity with applicable State and Federal laws, regulations,
and quality and safety standards. ' 3 8 The following year, Congress passed
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 ("OBRA 1981")
containing important Medicaid reforms.39 OBRA 1981 introduced
"Freedom of Choice" Waivers (§ 1915b)41 by which states wishing to enroll
Medicaid recipients in managed care organizations, could receive federal
permission to selectively contract with providers willing to offer discount
capitalization rates through a competitive bidding process in exchange for
a guaranteed enrollment of Medicaid recipients.41
36 See MEDICAID CHART3OK 2000, supra note 5, at 10.
37 Notably, the seeds for states' flexibility within the federally controlled
framework of Medicaid were down long before the new federalism. For example,
Section 1115 Waivers were enacted as part of the original Medicaid statute, though
states did not aggressively avail themselves of this flexibility until recently.38 ORA 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 962(a), 94 Stat. 2650.39 OBRA 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2173, 95 Stat. 808. Later, the amendment
was further extended to facilities for the mentally handicapped. See OBRA 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 421 1(h)(2)(A), 101 Stat. 1330-205.
40 OBRA also enacted Section 1915c Waivers to protect community based care
providers. See MEDICAID CHARTBOOK 2000, supra note 5, at 10.
41 For a full discussion of Medicaid waivers, see, for example, Elizabeth
Andersen, Administering Health Care: Lessons from the Health Care Financing
Administration's Waiver Policy-Making, 10 J.L. & POL. 215 (1994).
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In fact, the Medicaid waiver statutes represent a premier example ofthe
legislative federalism, by which statutory enactments and regulatory
revisions have gradually increased states' discretion to circumvent the
federal oversight that originally characterized this program. States that
obtain waivers from the Secretary of DHHS are able to revise their
Medicaid programs in ways that do not comply with federal guidelines and
law. The grant of these waivers receive little judicial scrutiny.42 Moreover,
beginning in 1993, the Executive Branch has encouraged DHHS to grant
these waivers to the states in order to grant increasing flexibility to the state
governments in administering their Medicaid Programs. The Section 1115
Research and Demonstration Projects waivers, and the Section 1915(b)
Freedom of Choice waivers are the primary vehicles by which states
obtained federal authority to rapidly expand their managed care contracts
within the Medicaid program.43
More recently, the Bush Administration has also made active use of
waivers to, in the words of the President, "empower states to propose
reforms tailored to the needs of their citizens." The Bush initiative, called
the "Health Insurance Flexibility and Accrutability Initiative" further
releases states from federal Medicaid rules, allowing them to revise
federally outlined benefit packages and eligibility rules. Moreover, the
Bush Administration is expanding flexibility for the states through use of
the Section 1915(c) immunity-based waivers;" and other specialized
waivers as well.46 The danger of these legislative shifts away from Federal
oversight toward state independence lies not only in the fact that
centralized uniformity of quality and eligibility standards may be
sacrificed,47 but also that, unlike traditionally provided Medicaid benefits,
Medicaid beneficiaries provided by states in these waiver programs create
42 Rosenberg & Zaring, supra note 1, at 548-49.
43 Managed care enrollment rose dramatically during the period from 1993 to
1999, due to states' obtaining waivers from the federal government. See James W.
Fossett & Frank J. Thompson, Back-offNotBacklash in Medicaid Managed Care,
24 J. HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & L. 1159, 1161 (Oct. 1999).
44 Medicaid: HHS to Allow States to Tailor Benefits Use Savings to Give
Coverage to Uninsured, Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA) (Aug. 7, 2001).
45 See Medicaid: Self-Directed Care a Standard Option in States' Community-
Based Waivers, Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA) (May 13, 2002).
46 See Medicaid: HHS Approves Cervical Cancer Waivers for Louisiana,
Wisconsin, Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA) (Apr. 22, 2002).
47 See Rosenberg & Zaring, supra note 1, at 554.
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no legally enforceable right to the benefits they provide to Medicaid
recipients.4
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court, in Wilder v. Virginia
Hospital Ass'n,"9 affirmed that under the Boren Amendment, institutional
providers had a private cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
permitted them to challenge unreasonably low Medicaid reimbursements
from the states. The Wilder Court construed the Boren Amendment to
create a cause of action for providers as the intended beneficiaries of that
statute." For a period, this Supreme Court case and its progeny reinstated
federal oversight to judicially scrutinize the level of states' Medicaid
reimbursements. As the expense of the increasing burden of covering
Medicaid costs grew, states began to "clamor" for the right to run their own
programs.5
In 1996 and 1997, Congress enacted two sweeping pieces of legislation
in an effort to address health care cost inflation, the first of which increased
federal control over their Medicaid programs, while the second increased
states' flexibility. First, in 1996, Congress enacted the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"),52 providing substantial
financial resources to the Health Care Financing Agency ("HCFA"), the
Inspector General, and the Department of Justice to enhance their efforts
to reduce the estimated ten percent of total Medicare and Medicaid costs
wasted on fraudulent and abusive claims.5 This statute effectively added
a layer of federal oversight to the Medicaid program.
48 See Westside Mothers v. Haveman, _ F.3d., 2002 WL 987291 (6th Cir.
2002) (holding Medicaid Act creates privately enforceable right against state
officials). The effect of the legislative trend toward increased state control resulted,
almost immediately, in decreased access to care for Medicaid patients. As one
commentator has put it, states "took advantage of their new freedom to underpay
... [providers so that] many physicians became unwilling to accept [Medicaid]
patients [and] many physicians became unwilling to accept such patients, and
concern grew about their access to care." HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 33 (with
discussion re Wilder). Ironically, the Congress responded to this concern by
enacting the 1997 Balanced Budget Amendment which replaced the Boren
Amendment with a significantly weaker provision from a reimbursement rate
perspective. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2001).
49 Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
51 Id. at 509-10.
51 See Hamme, supra note 8.52 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (1996) [hereinafter HIPAA].
13 See H.R. 104-496, 104th Cong. (1996), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865,
1869. HIPAA established the 'National Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The next year, Congress passed the BBA, 4 which introduced a variety
of managed care options for Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries;55
granted the states increased flexibility in administering Medicaid
programs;56 and implemented deep cuts in Medicare reimbursements
generally, and to rural health clinics specifically." Moreover, the BBA
repealed the Boren Amendment, replacing it with a more general provision
that each state "provide for a public process" to determine rates of
reimbursement for hospitals and nursing facilities." This more relaxed
provision, requiring adherence to a procedure rather than the Boren
Amendment's reasonableness standard, favored the states by reducing the
likelihood that providers and beneficiaries could raise successful challenges
to states' reimbursement rates. 9
The shift between federal and state control of Medicaid is as old as the
program itself. Most recently, the new federalism has been manifested in
the states' transition to managed care plans; the Clinton and Bush
Administrations' use of generous waiver standards, and finally the
regulatory tug-of-war over implementation of the BBA. In January 2001,
the Clinton Administration instituted a series of regulations, ostensibly to
implement the BBA's requirements but essentially attempting to exert
increased federal control over the quality and cost of states' Medicaid
plans. A short eight months later, in August 2001, the Bush Administration
Program." The stated purpose of the program is to "coordinate Federal, State and
local law enforcement to combat health care plan fraud." Id. at 1866. In order to
accomplish this purpose, HIPAA created a national fraud data bank and established
guidelines for the government to periodically publish fraud advisory opinions,
special fraud alerts, guidelines and interpretive opinions. Moreover, HIPAA
granted the government broader investigatory and audit authority and an expanded
range of intermediate sanctions and monetary penalties for a wide variety of
providers and situations. Overall, the effect of HIPAA was to broaden and
coordinate the federal government's ability to reduce the amount of the public fisc
wasted on paying for medical fraud.
54 Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251.
15 Id. §§ 4001-4006 (Medicare Part C called "Medicare + Choice").
16 Id. §§ 4901-4923 (Title XI of the Social Security Act establishing the State
Children's Health Insurance Program).
57 COUNCIL ON GRADUATE MED. EDUC., TENTH REPORT: PHYSICIAN DISTRIBU-
TION AND HEALTH CARE CHALLENGES IN RURAL AND INNER-CITY AREAS, at 3
(1998).
5842 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (2000).
59 It is unclear whether a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 remains
available to providers to challenge reimbursements under this new provision, as
was available under the Wilder Court's interpretation of the Boren Amendment.
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announced the repeal of the Clinton regulations, swinging the Medicaid
control pendulum back towards the states. The contours and tensions of
balancing power between the federal and state governments under our
Constitution is as old as the document itself.6 Today, this same debate is
nowhere more alive and of more practical importance, than in the contest
for control of the government's obligation, pursuant to the Medicaid Act of
1965, to provide health care to America's neediest.
I. MEDICAID AND THE "NEW" JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
The term "Federalism" describes the theory of relationship and
allocation of power between the federal and state governments based on the
premise that each "should be limited to [their] own sphere and, within that
sphere, should be independent of the other.' 6 The doctrine represents the
tension between the federal government's limited power, granted to it under
the United States Constitution by the sovereign states, and the residual
power of the several states, reserved to them by the Constitution's Tenth
Amendment. Issues of Federalism-the balance of power between the
federal and state governments-have been the subject of American
jurisprudence and politics since the nation's inception.62 Moreover, Chief
Justice John Marshall, in 1819, prophetically remarked that the central
question of federalism is "perpetually arising, and will probably continue
to arise, as long as our system shall exist."'63 As such, there really is nothing
60 One commentator observed that current debates and discussion offederalism
principles in the Congress and in our courts are "reminiscent of the early debates
between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists over ratification of the Constitution."
Leon Friedman et al., The New Federalism, 16 TOURO L. REv. 265 app. I, at 267
(2000).61 James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role ofNew Federalism and Public Health Law,
12 J.L. & HEALTH 309, 316 n.31 (1997-98) (quoting RUTH LOCKE ROETINGER,
THE SUPREME COURT AND STATE POLICE POWER: A STUDY IN FEDERALISM 5
(1957)).
6 Id. Hodge cites the debate between federalists and nationalists at the
Constitutional Convention which resulted in the "compromise" doctrine of
federalism. See id. at 314.
63 See McColloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819) ("But the question
respecting the extent of the powers actually granted, is perpetually arising, and will
probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist In discussing these
questions, the conflicting powers of the general and State governments must be
brought into view, and the supremacy of their respective laws, when they are in
opposition, must be settled.").
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new about the "new federalism."' Yet, the term new federalism connotes
what one commentator has called "two related strands" of judicial and
legislative pronouncements that have shifted power from the federal
government to the states.65
The judicial strand of the new federalism, foreshadowed by Justice
Powell's dissent in Cannon v. University of Chicago,' is marked by the
United States Supreme Court's decisions since the 1994-95 term, holding
no fewer than twenty federal statutes unconstitutionally intruded upon
states' authority.6 7 This trend has not been lost on the courts' construction
of the Medicaid Act.
64 For an excellent survey of the origins, decline and resurgence of Federalism,
both as a political and legal doctrine and application of this analysis specifically to
the federal government's role in protecting public health, see generally Hodge,
supra note 61.
65 See Modisett, supra note 18, at 141.
6Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1969) (Powell, J., dis-
senting) (Justice Powell explained the fundamental constitutional flaw in the
majority's decision to permit a woman denied admission to medical school which
received federal funds under Title IX, to claim gender discrimination in a civil
action against the medical schools by inferring a private cause of action under Title
IX). After Justice Powell explained that by creating private remedies where
Congress has not, he argued federal courts may not impermissibly "enlarge their
jurisdiction" contrary to the constitutional limits of federal jurisdiction set out in
Article Im ofthe United States Constitution. Id. at 730-31. For other early examples
of cases shaping the new federalism doctrine, see also California v. Sierra Club,
451 U.S. 287 (1981) (holding no private right of action implied on behalf of parties
injured by violations of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act); Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (declining to infer a private remedy for
damages in securities cases under Section 17(a) of the 1934 Securities and
Exchange Act); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(declining to create private actions under Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
However, it should be noted that the Supreme Court's reluctance to imply private
causes of action under federal statutes where Congress has been silent has not been
uniform. Compare Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (holding that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 creates a private cause of action for violation of the federal AFDC statute)
with Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981) (refusing to allow plaintiffs to invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to create private
remedy against state officials violating federal environmental statutes.).
67 See Friedman et al., supra note 60, at 265 ("Since the 1994-95 Supreme
Court Term, the Court has held twenty separate federal laws unconstitutional.").
See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding portions of the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act requiring state officers to conduct
background checks on handgun purchasers violated the Tenth Amendment);
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Even before repeal of the Boren Amendment, the new federalism
limited the reach of the Wilder decision. In 1992, two years after that case
was decided, the Supreme Court declined to follow Wilder in a case
holding there was no private cause of action to enforce the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 198068 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.69 The
Act at issue in that case was strikingly similar in structure to the Medicaid
Act. It was a reimbursement program, jointly run by the states and the
federal government, for which states had to submit an assistance plan in
order to receive federal funds for providing foster care to needy families.
Rejecting a private challenge to the state's control of its foster care
program, this case marked a judicial return of a degree of authority and
autonomy to the states as against the federal government. Lower courts
followed suit. In Minnesota Developmental Achievement Center Ass'n v.
Haas-Steffen," the Eighth Circuit rejected a challenge to changes in
Minnesota's Medicaid reimbursement rates on the grounds that the Boren
Amendment did not apply to developmental achievement centers.7' In Rx
Pharmacies Plus, Inc. v. Weil,72 a Colorado District Court sided with the
state which administered a managed care program for Medicaid recipients,
and rejected challenges to Colorado's plan brought by pharmacists and
Medicaid recipients.
Although Wilderhas never been expressly overruled, after repeal of the
Boren Amendment, courts further limited the extent to which states'
administration of their Medicaid programs could be challenged under
federal law. In Florida Ass'n of Rehabilitation Facilities, Inc. v. Florida
Dep 't of Health & Rehabilitative Services," the Eleventh Circuit rejected
a health provider's challenge to a state's Medicaid reimbursements for
services provided after 1997 when the Boren Amendment was repealed. In
Seminole Tribe ofFla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding Congress could not
violate States' Eleventh Amendment immunity except via the Fourteenth
Amendment); and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding federal
Gun Free School Zones Act exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause power).
68 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94
Stat. 500.69 Suterv. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, reversedon remand at Artist M. v. Johnson,
968 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1992).70 Minn. Dev. Achievement Ctr. Ass'n v. Haas-Steffen, 20 F.3d 889 (8th Cir.
1994).71Id. at 892.
72 Rx Pharmacies Plus, Inc. v. Weil, 883 F. Supp. 549 (D. Colo. 1995).
73 Fla. Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs.,
225 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2000).
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so doing, the Florida Ass'n Court summed up the effect that both the
judicial and legislative strands of the new federalism have had on the
Medicaid program's balance of power between state and the federal
governments, holding that "Congress's repeal of the Amendment
empowered states to replace their existing Boren-compliant rate plans with
new rate plans not subject to challenge based on the reasonableness and
adequacy requirements of the Boren Amendment."'74
Where Medicaid reforms are concerned, it is important to recognize
that the new federalism is not merely affecting a doctrinal shift or
interesting historical trend. Rather, the new federalism has the potential to
influence the health of the entire population of Medicaid enrollees."
Moreover, Rosenbaum and Rousseau report that children, women and
African Americans constitute the overwhelming majority of that
population.76 The new federalism in Medicaid, therefore, is a significant
public health issue that is affecting the most vulnerable populations in our
nation.
A. The New Federalism and Public Health
James Hodge, Jr. explains the relationship between public health law
and the new federalism as a "collision" between states' authority to
"regulate matters affecting the health, safety, and general welfare of the
public"-the states' police powers-and the federal government's power
to preempt state laws that intrude on areas of the federal government's
supreme lawmaking authority:77
When federalism concerns are more strongly emphasized, states have
more ability to regulate matters of public health pursuant to their police
powers. When federalism principles are weakened or ignored, states lose
out to federal interventions over such traditional exercises.
Thus, federalism preserves the police powers of the states and acts as
a barrier to federal legislative intervention in matters within the scope of
74Id. at 1217.
75 The Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA") reports that Medicaid
currently covers approximately thirty-six million individuals. See http://www.hcfa.
gov/medicaid/medicaid.htm. However theMedicaid Chartbook 2000, published in
September 2000, reports that in 1998 Medicaid served over forty million enrollees.
See MEDICAID CHARTBOOK 2000, supra note 5, at 12.76 See Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 19, at 28-29.
7 Hodge, supra note 61, at 315.
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those powers. It simultaneously restricts the federal government's ability
to regulate in the interests of public health since such regulation has
traditionally been the responsibility of state governments. Hanging in the
balance of these observations are the very goals of public health which
rely on the role federalism plays.
78
Medicaid reform defies the straight-forward, cause and effect
relationship between strong enforcement of federalism principles and
increased public health intervention that Hodge describes. Implied in
Hodge's equation is the conclusion that "weakened or ignored" federalism
may cause a loss not only to the states themselves but also to the overall
goals of public health. While there may be public health laws for which this
relationship is true, in Medicaid it is not necessarily the case. As discussed
in Part IV of this Article, in many states Medicaid suffers as a public health
tool when federalism principles are over-enforced to allow the states to
exceed what is traditionally a realm of federal regulation and
responsibility.79
Eleanor D. Kinney, noting the woeful lack of coordination between the
executive branch and the DHHS agency to which that branch has delegated
administrative authority over the Medicaid program, the declining
percentage of the poor covered by Medicaid, and wide disparities in the
states' Medicaid programs due to the structure of the Medicaid program,
raises this issue by asking, "Are all states committed and capable of
executing the responsibility of financing health care for the poor even with
substantial federal assistance, and are resulting disparities in the treatment
of protected groups by states tolerable?"" The next section of this article
suggests an empirical analysis to begin to answer these two questions
which are fundamental to evaluating the impact of new federalism on
Medicaid reform.
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH
IMPACT OF INCREASED STATE CONTROL OVER MEDICAID
The effect of the new federalism on Medicaid may be measured
empirically. For example, researchers have documented the fact that
disparity among the states' Medicaid coverage and expenditures increases
18Id. at 318.
79 See discussion infra Part IV.80 Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making for the Medicaid Program: A
Challenge to Federalism, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 857-58 (1990).
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as federal oversight of the program decreases." More recently, the steady
decline in Medicaid enrollment due to federal welfare reform enacted in
1996 has been explored in the literature. Using these two bodies of
research, this section of the article explores the following working
hypothesis: First, wide disparities already exist among the various states'
Medicaid programs. Second, applying the new federalism to Medicaid will
lead to a decline in federal oversight of the various states' Medicaid
programs. Declining federal influence will lead to an increase in the
number of uninsured people because some states will exercise their new
discretionary authority to shrink their Medicaid enrollments. Third, this
decreased access to healthcare will in turn lead to widening disparities in
the health status of Medicaid eligible populations. In short, the new
federalism will have an adverse impact on the public health of Medicaid's
target populations.
A. Disparities in State Medicaid Programs
Proving the first proposition of the working hypothesis is the easiest.
Differences in state program size, benefits, expenditures, and eligibility
criteria are reported anually and commented upon regularly.8' For
example, under federal law, the HCFA must report its Medicaid
expenditures quarterly. 3 Table 1 below selects enrollment and expenditure
81 See, e.g., Jerry Cromwell et al., Center for Health Economics Research,
DefederalizingMedicaid: Fair to the Poor, Fair to Taxpayers?, 12 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 1 (1987).
82 See, e.g., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, Kaiser Commission
on Medicaid and the Uninsured, at www.kff.org; see also the several reports
compiled by the General Accounting Office ("GAO") to evaluate Medicaid
expenditures. Some examples are: [GAO-01-883 ] Medicaid and SCHIP: States'
Enrollment and Payment Policies Can Affect Children's Access to Care;
[HEHS-99-65] Children's Health Insurance Program: State Implementation
Approaches Are Evolving; [-EHS-99-163] Medicaid Enrollment: Amid Declines,
State Efforts to Ensure Coverage After Welfare Reform Vary; [HEHS-95-122]
Medicaid: Spending Pressures Drive States Toward Program Reinvention;
[HEHS-98-62] Medicaid: Early Implications of Welfare Reform for Beneficiaries
and States; [HEHS/OSI-00-69] Medicaid in Schools: Improper Payments Demand
Improvements in HCFA Oversight.
83 "The Quarterly Medicaid Statement of Expenditures for the Medical
Assistance Program (Form CMS-64) is the accounting statement which States, in
accordance with 42 CFR 430.30(c), must submit each quarter under title XIX of
the Social Security Act (the Act)." HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., QUARTERLY MEDICAID STATEMENT OF EXPENDITURES
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information from these publically available sources to highlight the
disparities in Medicaid programs for selected states.
TABLE 1
Disparities in State Medicaid Enrollment
and Selected State Expenditures Statistics'
State Total Total Medicaid Ayerage
Enrollees Expenditures Pint Per Person
New York 3,500,292 $27,539,936,152 $8,356
Texas 2,680,583 10,272,990,995 3,800
Wisconsin 538,229 2,830,114,783 5,436
Mississippi 526,604 1,748,939,562 3,222
Kentucky 653,553 2,696,929,368 3,883
Alabama 649,302 2,386,960,623 3,782
Table 1 demonstrates that although New York and Texas, the second and
third largest Medicaid programs (after California, by number of enrollees)
serve close to the same number of Medicaid beneficiaries, Texas spends
roughly half of what New York does in payments to enrollees. Similarly,
although Wisconsin and Mississippi have almost an identical number of
people enrolled in Medicaid, their respective expenditures per person are
quite different.8 5 Also, Kentucky's spending is comparable to Alabama's
and to Texas' though the size of these respective programs measured both
in expenditures and number of enrollees is quite different.
FOR THE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM CMS-64, at http://www.hcfa.gov/
medicaid/ofs-64.htn.84 For the 1998 enrollment data see THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDA-
TION, Kaiser Commission on Medicaid Basics, at http://www.statehealthfacts.
kff.org; for the 1997 expenditure data seeMEDICAID CHARTBOOK2000, supra note
5, at 49.
85 Both the U.S. government and numerous commentators collect the data from
which similar comparisons may be made. See, e.g., Kinney, supra note 80, at 857,
for similar comparisons from earlier years' data.
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B. Decreased Federal Oversight Will Lead to Decreased Medicaid
Enrollment
It is also clear that as the federal government relaxes its role, some
states will exercise their newly granted flexibility to create policies that will
reduce coverage to different segments of the Medicaid population. Other
states will use increased autonomy and flexibility to expand access to
health care for working poor and near poor citizens within their borders.8 6
The result will be increasingly disparate Medicaid coverage for similarly
situated populations in the various states. Recent studies presented to
members of Congress confirm this conclusion.
In May 2000, the United States House of Representative's House Ways
and Means Committee released a report evaluating health coverage for
families leaving welfare.8 7 Included in that report was a pilot study of
twenty-one states, examining the changes in Medicaid enrollment between
the period from June 1997 to June 1999.8 Overall, the entire sample
experienced a dramatic decline in Medicaid enrollment from 1997 through
December 1998. That decline began to reverse in June 1999. Of note,
however, is the lack of uniformity in the extent of the decline amongst the
twenty-one states, and the disparate impact of the enrollment reversal. From
June 1997 through June 1998, only three of the sample states-Arkansas,
Massachusetts, and Oklahoma-experienced an increase in Medicaid
enrollments. The sharpest declines during that period were in Indiana,
Kansas and Texas. Figure 1 graphically illustrates the changes in Medicaid
86 Oregon and Tennessee, for example, are two states whose Medicaid reforms,
made pursuant to Section 1115 waivers have expanded access to low income
individuals previously ineligible to receive Medicaid, while simultaneously
reducing overall program costs, without any apparently detrimental affect on the
quality of health care beneficiaries received. See James F. Blumstein & Frank A.
Sloan, Health Care Reform Through Medicaid Managed Care: Tennessee
(TennCare) as a Case Study and Paradigm, 53 VAND. L. REv. 125, 136 (2000);
Rosenberg & Zaring, supra note 1, at 552 (describing Oregon, Hawaii, and South
Carolina successes in Medicaid reform).
87 See Health Coverage for Families Leaving Welfare, Hearings Before the
House Subcomm. on Human Res. of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong.
60-69 (2001) [hereinafterHouse Report] (statement of Vernon K. Smith, Principal,
Health Management Associates).88 Id. The twenty-one states included in the study, listed alphabetically, wereArizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin.
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enrollments for the twenty-one states studied during the first year following
the enactment of the PRWORA.
FIGURE 1"
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By the following year, however, several states had improved the percentage
changes in their enrollments, but some by more than others. The House
Report highlighted state policies in Indiana, Massachusetts and Oklahoma
that experienced particularly dramatic reversals in declining enrollments
from the previous year.9 These states' success at increasing Medicaid
enrollments from June 1998 to June 1999 testifies to comprehensive,
targeted outreach programs that simplified the Medicaid application
process, advertised its availability in a non-stigmatized way, and
aggressively sought to expand Medicaid coverage to uninsured
populations. 91 Figure 2 summarizes Medicaid enrollments for the same
twenty-one states during the second year of the study.
89 See House Report, supra note 87, at 65. Rounded to the nearest whole
number, the percentage enrollment changes for the first period from June 1997 to
June 1998 were as follows:
AZ CA IFL GA IL IN IIA KAA MI NJ MNYNC OH OK PA TN ITX IUT I kI
19 -4 -3 -2 -5 1-9 -4 -8 23 -I -3 -I -4 -2 4 -10 -3 -5 -7 -I -5 -3
9 Id.
9'Id
.
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This evidence demonstrates that the new federalism approach to Medicaid
will likely exacerbate already existing disparities among the states,
notwithstanding the fact that the Medicaid program's shared federal and
state partnership has always historically resulted in a network of fifty
distinct welfare plans, governed and administered by the separate states.
Certainly, there maybe other explanations for these changes in enrollment.
For example, the employment market in a given state or the state of the
overall economy may affect enrollment. However, the temporal proximity
between PRWORA's enactment and the declining enrollments strongly
suggest a causal link between the two events. Other research strengthens
this evidence of causality.
Joel Ferber and Theresa Steed, for example, describe the empirical
evidence that Medicaid enrollments have declined sharply since 1996. 91
Ferber and Steed explain the declines are due in large part to welfare
reform legislation which transformed the sixty-five year old federally run
national welfare program (Aid to Families with Dependent Children
Id. Rounded to the nearest whole number, the percentage changes for the
twenty one states studied were as follows:
AZ CAIFL IGA IL IN IA KA ,AMI N1 NMtNYJNC OH OK PA TN TX UT WIjAL
2 17 10 0 231-3 6 8 -3 -2 1131-3 2 2 14-2 4 2 1 -5 1
93 Joel Ferber & Theresa Steed, The Impact of Welfare Reform on Access to
Medicaid, Curing Systemic Violations ofMedicaid De-Linking Requirements, 45
ST. Louis U. L.J. 145 (2001).
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("AFDC")) into a state-run block grant welfare system.94 Congress enacted
the PRWORA to give states discretion over the cash assistance benefits
provided to needy families, for the express purpose of moving families off
welfare, and into the workforce.9s However, since the old federal welfare
system premised Medicaid eligibility upon enrollees' ability to meet AFDC
standards, Congress specifically enacted "de-linking" provisions that would
allow families removed from welfare eligibility to continue to receive
Medicaid health insurance for which they were eligible, independent of
their welfare status. Despite PRWORA's "de-linking" provisions, Ferber
and Steed have compiled research and studies that document not only the
decline in Medicaid coverage due to welfare reform, but also the fact that
families that lose Medicaid coverage as they enter the workforce, largely
end up in jobs that do not provide employer-sponsored health insurance.96
Moreover, there appears to be no commensurate rise in companion health
insurance programs such as the S-CHIP Program for children or the
Transitional Medical Assistance ('TMA") program for individuals just
entering the workforce. Therefore, these Medicaid-eligible families appear
to be leaving the Medicaid program only to swell the ranks of the
uninsured.97
Ferber and Steed go on to describe evidence that several states have
exercised their new found legislative flexibility to implement practices and
policies that contribute to, if not encourage, a decline in Medicaid
coverage.9" They report that twenty-three states offer "diversion grants" as
an alternative to receiving cash assistance under the Temporary Aid to
Needy Families ("TANF") program.99 Since beneficiaries must apply for
TANF and Medicaid via a joint application in many states, the diversion
grants not only distract enrollees from going on welfare, but also from
participating in states' Medicaid as well." ® Other state practices range from
automatic computer termination, to deliberately improper denials of
coverage.'0' Although Ferber and Steed conclude by suggesting several
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 155-57.
971Id. at 157, 168-71.98 Id. at 161-62.
99Id. at 162-63.
10 Id.
1I d. at 163-70. Reporting "systematic and unlawful terminations of Medicaid
coverage" in Missouri; "front end diversions" in New York (see Reynolds v.
Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)) (challenging New York's decision
to change public assistance centers to employment centers, thus erecting a barrier
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remedies to the reverse the Medicaid enrollment decline,"0 the problem
itself is an instructive example of the impact of the new federalism on
Medicaid access for the poor and disabled.
The decline in Medicaid enrollment due to increased state control over
welfare is not only a matter of policy interest, but it is also a matter of
public health concern. The objective of enacting the Medicaid Act was to
provide access to health care for America's poor and disabled, thereby
improving the health of these populations. To the extent that changes in
policy, practices and control of the Medicaid program reduce access to
coverage, these policies and practices reduce the quality of health for
Medicaid eligible populations.
C. Declining Medicaid Enrollment Will Adversely Influence Public
Health
The salient question, of course, is to what extent do these disparities
affect individuals' access to health care, and, in turn, their health, in the
various states. The House Report presents the results of a telling survey that
demonstrates the effects of losing Medicaid coverage on access to
healthcare. The study compares responses to sample questions about
healthcare access, given by people who experienced continuous Medicaid
coverage during the relevant period from 1995 to 1997, with answers to the
same questions from people who lost Medicaid coverage and became
uninsured after 1995. The four questions required both groups to report
whether they (1) had "No Usual Source of Care"; (2) were "'Very
Dissatisfied' with Health Care"; (3) had experienced "Barriers to Care";
and perhaps most importantly, (4) had experienced "No Physician Visit In
to obtaining Medicaid and other support); and more subtle practices discouraging
Medicaid applicants in other states such as North Carolina and Pennsylvania.1021 Id. at 184-205. Notably, some states have aggressively changed their admin-
istrative policies to address and reverse the decline in Medicaid enrollment at the
state level. See, e.g., Florida, Indiana, and Oklahoma results as reported in House
Report, supra note 87, at 4. It is of interest, however, to note the extent to which
the proposed solutions to the states' inability to properly implement de-linking
provisions are distinctly federal in nature. Not only Ferber and Steed, but
researchers, as well as legislators have shown that the steps states must take to
reverse the decline in Medicaid enrollment must be overseen by the federal
government. See, e.g., id. at 32-36 (statement of Marilyn Ellwood, Senior Fellow,
Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.). See also id. at 11 (statement of Hon. Fortney
Pete Stark, Member, House Subcomm. on Human Res. of the Comm. on Ways and
Means).
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[the] Past Year." ' 3 Figure 3 compares the responses of the people who had
lost Medicaid coverage, with the responses from people who retained
continuous Medicaid coverage.
FIGURE 3104
Effect of Losing Medicaid Coverage
On Access to Healthcare 1995-1997
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These responses confirm that individuals who lost their Medicaid coverage
between 1995 and 1997 experienced decreased access to health care. Thus,
it is fair to conclude from the empirical evidence that increasing states'
flexibility and control over Medicaid will decrease access to health care for
some citizens who would otherwise eligible for Medicaid coverage.
This empirical evidence raises a substantial public health concern. The
population at risk is readily identifiable: It is comprised of the 41.4 million
people enrolled in the Medicaid program as of Fiscal Year 1998."5 These
include 18.9 million children, 7.9 million adults, 6.6 million blind or
disabled Americans, and 3.9 adults over the age of sixty-five. Some
commentators have identified the significant role Medicaid plays in
protecting public health. Jane Perkins, for example, counts the 1993
103 House Report, supra note 87, at 47.
104 See id. The survey responses tabulated were comparisons of Medicaid
insured versus uninsured respondents. For each question, the uninsured responses
are shown first, and then the Medicaid insured respondents' answers are shown.
105 See MEDICAID CHARTBOOK 2000, supra note 5, at 12. "The federal fiscal
year is from Oct. 1 to Sept 30 of the following year." Id.
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Amendment to the Medicaid statute that enacted the Vaccine for Children
program a public health success attributable to the Medicaid program." 6
John Blum acknowledged the public health origins of the Medicaid
program itself. 7 However, the data reviewed herein suggests another
insight: whether the federal government or the states control Medicaid
eligibility will have a direct impact on the access Medicaid beneficiaries
will have to health care in the various states. Hence, the absence of
federally controlled uniformity may adversely affect the health of some
Medicaid dependent populations who most then rely on their state
governments to administer the nations health care safety net. The final
section of this Article therefore turns to consider what are the parameters
of the federal government's constitutional duty to protect the health of the
vulnerable populations.
V. A PROPOSAL TO SHIFT THE CONCERN OF NEW FEDERALISM
FROM LIMITs ON FEDERAL POWER, TO CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFINING
THE GOVERNMENT'S INHERENTLY FEDERAL ROLE
It has become axiomatic that "[i]n the context of public health,.., the
Constitution acts as both a fbuntain and a levee; it originates the flow of
power---to preserve the public health, and it curbs that power."'0 8 Thus,
constitutional law scholars historically0 9 and contemporarily,"' have been
concerned with defining the limits and extent of the government's flow of
power. The Medicaid program specifically raises questions with respect to
the balance between federal and state power, much like the questions raised
in every other context, examining both the fountain and levee functions of
106 See Jane Perkins, Medicaid: Past Successes and Future Challenges, 12
HEALTH MATRIX 7 (Winter 2002).
'
07 See John Blum, Overcoming Managed Care Regulatory Chaos Through a
Restructured Federalism, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 327, 329 (Summer 2001).
108 Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Law, in JUDITH AREEN ET AL., LAW
SCIENCE AND MEDICINE 520 (2d ed. 1996). See also James G. Hodge, Jr., National
Health Information Privacy and New Federalism, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 791, 805 (2000).
o9 See Hodge, supra note 61, at 315-16 (quoting Alexander Hamilton's
observations on the limits of national government and, also, concluding "[t]he
meaning of federalism, after all, has been the primary political issue for most of
American history").
10 See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public
Health and the Role of the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
267 (1993).
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the federal law. The first relevant question is "whether the Medicaid-
eligible population is a community to whom the government owes any
specific duty to protect their overall health?"'' This first question asks
whether the flow of government power reaches the health issues of this
particular population. If the answer is "yes," as I suggest, then the second
question is "which government-federal or state-should be primarily
responsible for preserving the health of this population?""1 2 This second
question asks what is the shape of the Medicaid levee? To properly answer
these questions, however, we must depart from the current approaches
taken by the recent cases and commentary. The key to resolving the
federalism issues raised by Medicaid reform does not derive merely from
understanding the limits needed to curb the federal government's power,
but rather requires a grasp of the doctrinal provisions of the Constitution
that mandate the continued strong presence of federal authority vis a vis the
sovereign states and private individuals in providing access to health care
to the populations. Medicaid will continue to fulfil its public health
purposes only to the extent that the new federalism supports a strong
federal role in protecting poor, elderly and disabled citizens' health rather
II This question is raised here in a specifically legal context. That is, I am not
asking here whether this is a population that should be afforded government
assistance from a medical or even public health perspective. The public health
inquiry considers the nature of risk this population faces, the probability of the
risks, and the seriousness of the disease processes to which the population is
exposed to determine whether the public health risk mandates government or other
intervention. See, e.g., EDwARD J. BURGER, JR., PROTECTiNG THE NATIoN's
HEALTH 53-56 (1976). Rather, the questions raised in this section concern the
sources, content and limits of law that assign responsibility to the government to
act on behalf of a population's health needs.
1' Professors James F. Blumstein and Frank A. Sloan have ably argued that
cooperative federalism in Medicaid gives rise to political moral hazard, causing
states to overspend on health care for the poor, because the pact of their spending
is not fully borne by state governments themselves. Blumstein and Sloan further
refer to a "lock in" effect that prevents states from reversing patterns of over
spending once federal and state funds have been committed to expanded Medicaid
programming. See Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 86, at 125. Absent from their
discussion, however, is any objective measure of whether the amount spent on
healthcare for the poor and near poor is, in fact, at an optimal level. It is entirely
possible that states avoid another moral hazard-that of under spending on
healthcare in favor of local projects fueled by private or special interests rather than
society's most efficient level.
than encourages the central government to abdicate its role to the sovereign
states.
A. Federal and State Governments Powers Under the Constitution
In his seminal book, Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint,
Lawrence 0. Gostin sets forth the principles of democratic theory and
constitutional law that support the conclusion that the basic obligation of
an organized society is to protect and preserve the health of its citizens." 3
Further, Gostin finds that the United States Constitution ascribes that role
to the government.' Beginning with the Preamble to the Constitution,
Gostin points to the Framers' stated objective to "promote the general
welfare" and "common good" as the basis for finding constitutional
authority for the government's obligation to preserve public health."5 The
Constitution provides authority for both the federal and state governments'
role in protecting public health.
The legislative authority for Congress to tax, spend and regulate
commerce comprise the core of the Constitution's grant of power to the
federal government to protect public health. Gostin explains that Article I,
Section 8 defines the "foremost" federal powers for public health
purposes." 6 The power to tax is important as a source of federal revenue,
and the means ofregulating risk behavior or creating incentives for private
activities that enhance the public's health. The spending power delegated
to Congress, Gostin explains, authorizes direct financing to protect public
health, safety and well being, and gives the federal government the
authority to condition the use of federal funds upon conformance with
federal health standards."7 The Commerce Clause, according to Gostin,
irovided much of the regulatory authority the federal government has relied
upon since the New Deal era to address public health issues." 8 But as early
"3 See LAWRENCE 0. GOsTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT
(2000).
114Id. at 5-22.
"
5 Id. at 6. Wendy Parmet further points to the presence of disease and public
health needs prevalent during the "framing era," to find historical support for the
federal government's obligation to provide for public health. "Despite the
disagreement and uncertainty over the actual meaning of 'the common good,' it
seems likely that the preservation of public health ... was one meaning that all
would share." See Parmet, supra note 110, at 6.
116 GOsTIN, supra note 113, at 35-36.
"
7 Id. at 38.
118 Id. at 40. Gostin also describes the changing Supreme Court view of
Commerce Clause authority for such federal activities as food and drug safety,
environmental restrictions and soil and water protection.
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as 1798,"9 Gostin records the numerous federal agencies that have served
public health goals in order to describe a historical argument for the federal
government's "presence" in public health regulation. 2 Finally, the
Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress authority to enact any other
laws required and "reasonably appropriate" to achieve the public health
purposes that are consistent with its constitutional authority."'
Despite the federal authority and exercises of power Gostin chronicles,
public health functions have historically been the purview of state
government. The states' public health authority emanates first from the
Tenth Amendment" which reserves all powers not delegated to the federal
government, to the state government and to the people. Thus the "police
power"'---the broadest inherent authority of a government to regulate to
preserve, protect and promote health safety, morals and general
welfare-belongs first and foremost to state government. 24 Hodge explains
that police power is the core source of legal authority to perform public
health functions,'" and are at the core of what defines state government.'26
Finally, the states' parenspatriae powers also provide a source for these
9 John Adams signed a bill that created the first United States Marine Hospital
in 1798. Id. at 41.
'
2 Id. at 41. But cf Hodge, supra note 61, at 330 (Prior to the New Deal era,
federal "presence" in public health was nominal. Hodge also describes the Supreme
Court's initial opposition, on federalism grounds, to increasing the federal
government's public health role.). See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 77
(1936) (striking the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 and decrying a "central
government exercising uncontrolled police power in everiy state of the union,
superseding all local control or regulation of the affairs or concerns of the states").
2 GosTiN, supra note 113, at 35.
'2 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
" Hodge credits ChiefJustice Marshall with an early use of the phrase, "police
power" in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 442 (1827) ("The power to direct the
removal of gunpowder is a branch of the police power, which unquestionably
remains, and ought to remain, with the states."); see Hodge, supra note 61, at 321
n.65.
124 See GOSTIN, supra note 113, at 48-50; see also Hodge, supra note 61, at
319-22 (explaining that since the states were sovereign before formation of the
United States, the police power is reserved to them).
125 Innumerable examples abound in history and contemporary life, but a few
include state initiated disease quarantines, inoculation programs, data collection,
sanitation regulations, property closings, and educational campaigns. These are all
exercises of the states' police power.
126Hodge, supra note 61, at 323-24.
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sovereign governments to protect the health, particularly of children and the
mentally ill, or the community as its health is threatened by those who
cannot care for themselves.'7 The constitutional and historical authority for
both state and federal government role in protecting public health is clear.
It is also clear that providing access to health care under the Medicaid Act
represents a legitimate exercise of federal spending and state police powers
under the Constitution. Thus, the answer to the question of whether the
constitutional flow of government power reaches the public health
objectives of the Medicaid Act, is clearly "yes."
B. Balancing the Federal and State Government Powers
As the federal government began to assume a more visible presence in
public health regulation and control, it fell to the United States Supreme
Court to serve as the interpreter of the meaning of federalism in practice.
The Court's interpretations, in large part, have defined the swings between
federal and state control of public health law cases. Beginning first from
the strong federalist roots displayed in the Court's earliest decisions, 2'
through the period immediately prior to the New Deal, the U.S. Supreme
Court employed federalism doctrine to favor strong state governments. In
1933, the Court in United States v. Butler, struck down the Agricultural
Adjustment Act passed that year, holding that it impermissibly intruded
upon the police powers reserved to the states. 9 While Butler does not
concern a public health issue, it is exemplary of the strong federalist views
the Court expressed on behalf of the states prior to the New Deal era.
127 The term "parens pafriae" means "parent of the country." This term has
been flexibly interpreted to grant states the authority to act on behalf of incompe-
tent citizens (i.e., through guardianship) and to support the states' standing to sue
on behalf of community interests. See, e.g., Support Ministries for Persons with
AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford, New York, 799 F. Supp. 272 (N.D.N.Y. 1992)
(holding that state officials had standing to sue under parens patriae capacity to
protect the HIV-infected population).
2 See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
129 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 77 (1936).
The expressions of the framers of the Constitution, the decisions of this
court interpreting that instrument, and the writings of great commentators
will be searched in vain for any suggestion that there exists in the clause
under discussion [Art. I, Sec. 8] or elsewhere in the Constitution, the
authority whereby every provision and every fair implication from that
instrument may be subverted, the independence of the individual states
obliterated, and the United States converted into a central government
exercising uncontrolled police power in every state of the Union, supersed-
ing all local control or regulation of the affairs or concerns of the states.
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The familiar line of cases that signaled a shift in the Court away from
rigid, states' rights federalism, towards a willingness to liberally construe
the federal government's powers to tax, spend and regulate commerce is
summarized by Hodge and others elsewhere. 3 However, it is worth
mentioning here that if these cases generally represented the albeit
temporary demise of the federalism doctrine, the death knell to old
federalism jurisprudence was dealt in United States v. Darby.131
In Darby, the Supreme Court upheld Congress' authority to regulate
interstate commerce via the Fair Labor Standards Act and expressly held,
"[ilt is no objection to the assertion of the power to regulate interstate
commerce that its exercise is attended by the same incidents which attend
the exercise of the police power of the states."'' 3 This case ushered in a
period of judicially recognized "national police powers" which served the
federal exercise of public health authority well. During this period, the
Congress enacted the Hill Burton Act. lodge records the post-New Deal
developments in federal public health law including the development of the
Center for Disease Control, the National Institutes of Health, the Food and
Drug Administration and the passage of Medicaid and Medicare
legislation.133 Federal regulatory and legislative activity during the post-
New Deal era was expansive. The Supreme Court initially supported the
federal government's role but that support began to wane as the new
federalism began to take shape. One commentator, seeing the different
composition of the Court and cadre of public health law issues facing the
federal courts has lamented, "[w]hile the existing allocation of powers
between national and state governments seem[ed] well-suited to
accomplishing these national public health objectives, there is just one
problem. Federalism is back." 34
In public health law and other cases, however, the resurrection of
traditional federalism principles began in 1976 when the Court in National
League of Cities v. Usery'35 struck down Congressional amendments to the
Fair Labor Standards Act that intruded on traditional state police powers.
Although that case was later overruled, 36 it marked the beginning of a
30 See, e.g., Hodge, supra note 61, at 333-35.
"I United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
'
3 2 Id. at 114.
3 See generally Hodge, supra note 61, at 335-38.
"3 Id. at 338-39 (emphasis omitted).
135 Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
136 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528.
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coalition formed on the Court that eventually developed the judicial strand
of the new federalism137 in the following decade. According to Gostin,
Justice Rehnquist, author of the 1976 National League of Cities opinion,
now leads a "reenergized majority on the Supreme Court... actively
recentering the balance between national and state power." 3 '
The first new federalism pronouncement in public health came in New
York v. United States,139 in which the Supreme Court held the "take title"
provision of the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 1985 ("LLRWPA") violated the Tenth Amendment. Describing the
arguments that the LLRWPA violated the Tenth Amendment and that it
legislated outside the enumerated powers of Congress "mirror images" of
one another, the New York Court held, "[w]hether one views the take title
provision as lying outside Congress' enumerated powers, or as infringing
upon the core of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, the
provision is inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government." 140
The Supreme Court again faced a public health issue in 1997. InPrintz
v. United States,' the Court reiterated federalism principles as the basis
for striking down portions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act
which commanded state officials conduct background checks. The Printz
Court stated that:
[i]t is incontestible that the Constitution established a system of 'dual
sovereignty.' Although the States surrendered many of their powers to the
new Federal Government they retained 'a residuary and inviolable
sovereignty.'...
The Framers' experience under the Articles of Confederation had
persuaded them that using the States as the instruments of federal
governance was both ineffectual and provocative of federal-state
conflict.... The great innovation of this design was that 'our citizens
would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each
protected from incursion by the other.... 142
137 In a Kentucky Law Journal article, Donald E. Wilkes, Jr. may have been the
first to coin the term "new federalism" according to Hodge. See Hodge, supra note
61, at 339 n.180 (citing Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism in Criminal
Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY. L.J. 421 (1974)).
138 GOsTIN, supra note 113, at 56.
139 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
1411d. at 177.
141 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
1421d. at918-20 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,457 (1991); Tafflin
v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455,458 (1990); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S.
779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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Similar to the Supreme Court's new federalism which focuses on the
levee function of the Constitution, public health law scholarship has been
primarily concerned with restricting the extent to which the federal
government might overreach its authority. While the Court's concern has
been preventing federal power from infringing upon state sovereignty,
modem public health law literature addresses the threat that the federal
government might over-extend its power to interfere with individual
personal rights. 43 Indeed, according to Gostin, "[m]uch of the history of
public health.., involves earnest debate over the relationship between the
power of government and the freedom of individuals."1' In order to answer
the second question posed at the beginning of this section-which
government should be primarily responsible for Medicaid-I propose a
departure from this debate. Medicaid policy must not neglect the
Constitutionalfountain of federal power. Medicaidwill continue to provide
a health care "safety net" to America's most vulnerable citizens only if the
inherently federal responsibility of administering that program remains
under the federal government's control. The next section summarizes the
sources of law from which federal authority to control Medicaid flows.
C. The Inherently Federal Responsibility to Protect the Public Health of
Medicaid-Eligible Population
This Article has concluded above that the government's obligation to
protect the public health is both constitutional and democratic. It is
practical as well. Public health is essential for a political community, not
just for the individuals in that community, but for the life of that
community itself. The community's ability to create and sustain an
economy, social interaction, raise a defense, and perform any defining
functions will be compromised without a way to ensure the health of its
participants. However, where the health of the most needy and least
productive members of the community are concerned, the practical
motivations for the government's public health mission begin to blur. It is
143 See GOSTIN, supra note 113, at 63-64, 86-87, for excellent and comprehen-
sive summaries of the numerous specific contests between the government's
exercise of its public health authority and personal liberties. A few examples
include, state vaccination programs versus religious freedom and individual
autonomy; nuisance abatement versus freedom from taking and unrestricted
property rights; mandatory testing, screening, data collection and disease reporting
versus individual rights to privacy and freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure.
144 Id. at 59.
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here that the constitutional mandates become essential. The federal
government's obligation to the Medicaid population rests upon the source
of the Medicaid entitlements, the Supreme Court's interpretation of those
rights, and the constitutional protections historically extended to the
demographic groups that dominate the Medicaid-eligible population.
First, although there is no recognized right to health care generally,14
the Medicaid statute, enacted pursuant to the congressional power to tax,
spend and regulate commerce, creates an expectation, indeed a recognized,
enforceable right to receive the health care the government has funded.
Applying the familiar elements of the implied remedy doctrine,'46 the
Medicaid statute's federally defined eligibility standards identify the target
population the statute is intended to specially benefit. Moreover, the statute
is intended to provide health care access to these populations and fund this
care. Finally, it is consistent with the traditionally dominant oversight the
federal government has provided in Medicaid to conclude that the federal
government has assumed a role neither historically nor feasiblely filled by
state government.
Further evidence of the constitutional justification for federal control
over Medicaid lies in the judicial view of the demographic community the
program serves. In equal protection jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
extended the highest degree of deference to legislative efforts to protect
precisely the segments of the population who are overwhelmingly
represented among Medicaid enrollees or Medicaid eligible populations. 147
In 1997, over forty percent of all people with incomes below the federal
poverty line were enrolled in Medicaid; over twenty percent of all African-
Americans were enrolled in Medicaid; nine percent of all American women
were enrollees; and the highest percentage of all enrollees were children
under the age ofnineteen. 4 8 The compellingneed to eliminate the disparity
of health care access and health care outcomes for these populations rests
in their dependence and vulnerability; the fact is that only the collective
action of the national community will protect the public health of this
population. James Blumstein has observed that the Supreme Court focuses
on three factors to determine whether a federal "right" should be
,
45 See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
'46 See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
'4' See James F. Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A Constitutional,
Legal, and Policy Analysis, 59 TEx. L. REv. 1345, 1381 (1981) ("The essential
equal protection inquiry is the determination of the content of the state's burden of
justification.").See Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 19, at 28-29.
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recognized in a given area. Those factors are (1) the importance and
constitutional connections of the interest at stake; (2) whether the state has
monopolized access to the service in question; and (3) whether there has
been an absolute deprivation of the service at issue.1 49 Medicaid's
importance and constitutional connections are clear; the state's monopoly
over access to health care for this population is evidenced by the absolute
deprivation of health care that results when the federal government
withdraws. Applying Blumstein's factors, we must conclude that the
essential mission of public health--4o promote the physical and mental
health of populations-can only be fulfilled where the Medicaid eligible
population is concerned, by the "broad exercise of federal powers in a
centralized, national government."'50
VI. CONCLUSION
The federalism doctrine grounded in the Constitution establishes
balance between federal and state power. Across history, that balance has
never been static, but as with the government's obligation to protect the
public health of the needy, the balance changes as the political and judicial
environment shifts. However, in light of the empirically demonstrable
disparity that results from increased state control of Medicaid, this program
may implicate a uniquely federal concern. In fact, the newest concern of the
new federalism may be to preserve the admittedly limited and delegated
power of the federal government, so that the states' exercise of their Tenth
Amendment police powers does not compromise equal access to federally
funded healthcare for Medicaid beneficiaries who are predominately
women, minorities, elderly, disabled and children.
'
49 See James Blumstein, Constitutional Perspectives on Governmental Deci-
sionsAffectingHuman Life andHealth, 40 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231,259-62
(Autumn 1976).
'
50 See Hodge, supra note 61, at 312.
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